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KAIROS AND AMERICAN LEGAL PRAXIS
Clarke Rountree
INTRODUCTION
“To every thing there is a season,
and a time to every purpose under the heaven:
A time to be born, and a time to die;
A time to plant, and a time to pluck up that which is planted;
A time to kill, and a time to heal;
A time to break down, and a time to build up;
A time to weep, and a time to laugh;
A time to mourn, and a time to dance;
A time to cast away stones, and a time to gather stones together;
A time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing;
A time to get, and a time to lose;
A time to keep, and a time to cast away;
A time to rent, and a time to sew;
A time to keep silence, and a time to speak;
A time to love, and a time to hate;
A time of war, and a time of peace.”—Ecclesiastes 3:1–81
This passage from Ecclesiastes was popularized by the 1960s American
rock group, The Byrds, in their hit song, Turn! Turn! Turn! written by Pete
Seeger.2 The Greek version of this passage in the Septuagint includes twentynine uses of the term Kairos, from which we get English translation as time.3
The sense of “proper time” or “opportune moment” and “fit” in the use of
Kairos here reflects a well-settled concept that is almost as richly textured and
complex as the term logos, evolving over hundreds of years.4 Notably, for my
purposes here, Kairos became a central term in ancient rhetoric that, I will
demonstrate, remains relevant for understanding contemporary American legal
praxis.
This paper begins with a review of ancient uses of this term, particularly its
role in early Greek rhetorical theory. Next, I will consider how Kairos is central
 The author would like to thank Edward Schiappa for invaluable feedback on an early draft
of this paper.
1 Ecclesiastes 3:1–8.
2 See Nick Keppler, Turn! Turn! Turn!—The Byrds’ 1965 Hit Used Lyrics That Dated Back
More Than 2,000 Years, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://ig.ft.com/life-of-a-song/turnturn-turn.html [https://perma.cc/N2AL-A8J3].
3 Septuagint 3:1–8; see also infra Part I.
4
See infra Part I.
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to an important contemporary debate in rhetorical theory concerning Lloyd F.
Bitzer’s conception of “the rhetorical situation.”5 As I will show, that debate
highlights an issue concerning Kairos that was never directly addressed by ancient writers—the sources of the “opportune moment” to which Kairos responds.
I will make a rather obvious, if almost unremarked point, that has implications for contemporary legal praxis: unlike Samuel Beckett’s characters who
are “Waiting for Godot,”6 rhetors do not always bide their time until “opportune moments” or “kairotic situations” arise. Rather, they sometimes work to
create them, setting stages that they then take. This is particularly evident in
contemporary litigation campaigns, such as those addressing racial segregation
and abortion.7 Such groundwork may also be observed in the operation of legal
standards and procedures, as well as some judicial decision making.8 This paper will argue that understanding such preparatory work by legal groups, judges, and the legal community as a whole will provide a richer appreciation of
what it means to adapt to “opportune moments” in the practice of legal rhetoric.
Finally, I offer a framework for analyzing such pre-kairotic work.
I.

KAIROS IN ANCIENT GREECE

Although in late antiquity Kairos came “to mean ‘due measure,’ ‘fitness,’
‘opportunity,’ etc.,” its earliest usages were more literal.9 Homer and Euripides
used Kairos to indicate a vulnerable place for mortally wounding a combatant
with a weapon, such as an uncovered place on the head “where penetration was
most easy . . . .”10 Classicist Richard Broxton Onians argues that we should
read Kairos here not as referring to a “target” but rather an “opening,” such as
the holes in the aligned twelve axe heads that Odysseus shoots an arrow
through at the end of The Odyssey.11 He notes, “[w]e, ourselves, speak of ‘an
opening’ in just this sense (cf. also ‘loophole’).”12
Homer and other writers used a differently accented variation of Kairos
(καῖρος rather than καιρός) to refer to the opening in threads through which a
shuttle passes in weaving, one pass of which is called a “shot,” strengthening
Onians’s analogy to an opening for an arrow.13 Notably, this physical opening
in weaving adds a sense of timing that is associated with “opportunity” and

5

Infra Part II.
See generally SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT (1955).
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part III.
9 RICHARD BROXTON ONIANS, THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN THOUGHT: ABOUT THE BODY, THE
MIND, THE SOUL, THE WORLD TIME, AND FATE 343 (2d ed. 1954).
10 Id. at 343–44.
11 Id. at 344–45.
12 Id. at 345.
13
Id. at 345–46.
6
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“critical time,” “for there the opening in the warp [during the weaving process]
lasts only a limited time, and the ‘shot’ must be made while it is open.”14
Hesiod uses Kairos in Work and Days to convey a sense of due measure or
proper proportion, warning about overloading a wagon and causing its axle to
break.15 Phillip Sipiora notes that Hesiod may be the source of maxim,
“[o]bserve due measure, and proportion [Kairos] is best in all things.”16 Although the sense of time is lost there, the notion of adaptation to circumstances
connects this usage to Homer’s.
From the end of the Archaic period to the early part of the Classical period,
Greek writers from Pythagoras to Pericles to Aeschylus “use[d] Kairos to signify opportunity, occasion, crisis or urgency, measure, proportionality (which
carries connotations of justice), convenience, advantage, profit, fruit, fitness,
propriety, and decorum.”17 Some Greeks made kairos foundational to their philosophies.18 The late John E. Smith, Clark Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
Yale, asserted that “the watchword of pre-Socratic ethics was ‘Know the opportunity’ in the context of human action, [while] the Pythagoreans regarded
Kairos as ‘one of the laws of the universe.’ ”19 James L. Kinneavy adds that
“several of the Pythagoreans made the mastery of Kairos to be the essence of
philosophy,” quoting Augusto Rostagni’s (translated) claim that the Pythagoreans believed that “[t]he most important thing in every action is ‘Kairos.’ ”20
Catherine Eskin argues that the Greek physician Hippocrates successfully
departed from other healers by “mak[ing] room for individuality and case specificity . . . us[ing] the concept of Kairos[;]” such a perspective allowed him “to
express the variable components of medical practice more accurately.”21 Hippocrates specifically invokes the role of kairos in healing in his Precepts, where
he insists: “Time [chronos] is that wherein there is opportunity [kairos], and
opportunity [kairos] is that wherein there is no great time [chronos]. Healing is
a matter of time [chronos], but it is sometimes also a matter of opportunity
[kairos].”22 Eskin argues that “[k]airos, as the term denoting a particular con14

Id. at 346.
HESIOD, WORK AND DAYS 28 (A.E. Stallings trans., Penguin Classics 2018).
16 Phillip Sipiora, Kairos: The Rhetoric of Time and Timing in the New Testament, in
RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 116 (Phillip Sipiora &
James S. Baumlin eds., 2002).
17 Id.
18 John E. Smith, Time and Qualitative Time, in RHETORIC AND KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY,
THEORY, AND PRAXIS 48 (Phillip Sipiora & James S. Baumlin eds., 2002).
19 Id.
20 James L. Kinneavy, Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory, in RHETORIC AND
KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 59 (Phillip Sipiora & James S. Baumlin
eds., 2002).
21 Catherine R. Eskin, Hippocrates, Kairos, and Writing in the Sciences, in RHETORIC AND
KAIROS: ESSAYS IN HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRAXIS 98 (Phillip Sipiora & James S. Baumlin
eds., 2002).
22 1 HIPPOCRATES, Precepts, in HIPPOCRATES 313 (W.H.S. Jones trans., Harv. Univ. Press
1923).
15
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text and a time dependent upon situational determinants, was necessarily the
best word available to Hippocrates to express his ideas.”23
In its involvement with opportune moments, adaptation to particular cases,
and giving due measure, Kairos was well suited to inform the practice of rhetoric as it was beginning to be theorized and taught. Mario Untersteiner’s provocative early book on the older Sophists credits Gorgias as an early practitioner of
Kairos, which featured “[a]bove all . . . the capacity to improvise speeches . . . .”24 Ancient sources suggest that Gorgias was highly adaptive because
“he knew everything and could speak on any theme, relying on the occasion.”25
Gorgias’s Kairos, Untersteiner argues, “can be defined as ‘that which is fitting
in time, place and circumstance’, which means the adaptation of the speech to
the manifold variety of life, to the psychology of speaker and hearer: variegated, not absolute unity of tone.”26 Bruce McComiskey agrees that “it is necessary for the Gorgianic orator to know and be able to apply all of the different
rhetorical techniques to any logos in any kairotic situation.”27 He calls Kairos
“Gorgias’s most prominent rhetorical principle . . . .”28
The philosophical or pedagogical differences between writers of ancient
rhetorical theory did not determine their recognition of the importance of
kairos. Isocrates, in Against the Sophists, insisted that “oratory is good only if it
has the qualities of fitness for the occasion [Kairos], propriety of style, and
originality of treatment . . . .”29 Even Plato, who disparaged rhetoric’s “flattery”
of the audience in Gorgias, made kairos central to his ideal rhetoric at the end
of Phaedrus, describing rhetoric’s ultimate goal and the means to achieve it:
Since it’s the function of speech to lead the soul, a would-be orator must know
how many types of soul there are. . . . [He will discover that] [p]eople with suchand-such a nature are easy to persuade of such-and-such by speeches of suchand-such a type for reason x, while people with such-and-such a nature are hard
to persuade for reason y. . . . When he can not only say what kind of person is
persuaded by what kind of speech, but also spot that kind of person before him
and tell himself that here, in real life and before his eyes, is the kind of person
and the kind of character which was the subject of those earlier discussions, and
to which such-and-such a kind of speech should be applied in such-and-such a
way to persuade him of such-and-such—once he is capable of doing all this, and
moreover has understood the proper moments [Kairos] for speaking and for
keeping quiet, and can also recognize the appropriate and inappropriate occasions for concision, arousing pity, shocking the audience, and all the various
23

Eskin, supra note 21, at 99.
MARIO UNTERSTEINER, THE SOPHISTS 197 (Kathleen Freeman trans., Basil Blackwell
1954).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 BRUCE MCCOMISKEY, GORGIAS AND THE NEW SOPHISTIC RHETORIC 30 (2002) (second
emphasis added).
28 Id. at 111.
29 2 ISOCRATES, Against the Sophists, in ISOCRATES 171 (George Norlin trans., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1929).
24
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modes of speech he has learnt, then and only then will his expertise have been
perfected and completed.30

Seizing the kairotic moment for Plato, then, covers a wide range of variables (audience, type of speech, purpose, occasion) and a wide range of rhetorical choices (style, emotional appeals, reasoned appeals), including when to
withhold speech.31
Although Aristotle does not use the term in his definition of rhetoric, his
emphasis on adapting the available means of persuasion “according to a ‘right
measure’ or ‘proportion’ of topic and audience’ ” suggests a concern for kairos
in adapting to the particulars of the “given case.”32 Kinneavy and Sipiora both
explain how Aristotle tied his artistic appeals—involving speaker credibility,
audience emotions, and reason (i.e., ethos, pathos, and logos)—to kairos in
adapting to the particulars of a situation.33 Kinneavy shows that, despite Aristotle’s emphasis on general rules for rhetoric, he is sensitive to kairotic concerns
in forensic, deliberative, and epideictic speaking, as well as in rhetorical choices involving style and arrangement.34
We should not be surprised that philosophical and pedagogical opponents
in ancient Greece came to make Kairos central to their rhetorical systems.
Rhetoric as an art adapted to the particulars of a situation for pragmatic ends
requires a consideration of and adaptation to variables involving the audience,
occasion, speaker, purpose, and context.35
Consider a recent example that reflects the complexity of variables involved in a rhetorical situation: the “#MeToo” movement began in 2017 in response to sexual-harassment allegations against film producer Harvey Weinstein.36 It developed against a backdrop of decades of sexual harassment in the
workplace that persisted despite inroads made on behalf of sexual equality in
the United States over more than 150 years.37 It was shaped by the election of

30

PLATO, PHAEDRUS 271d–72b (Robin Waterfield trans., 2002).
McComiskey distinguishes Plato’s use of kairos in noting that “its purpose lies only in the
adaptation of universal truth to various audiences.” MCCOMISKEY, supra note 27, at 63.
32 Sipiora, supra note 16, at 118.
33 Kinneavy, supra note 20, at 69–73; Sipiora, supra note 16, at 118.
34 Kinneavy, supra note 20, at 68–69, 72–73.
35 Aristotle discusses these elements in his influential book on rhetoric, ARISTOTLE, ON
RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 47–48 (George Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 2d ed. 2007), and public speaking books today consider them central to the study of
rhetorical situations. See, e.g., STEPHEN E. LUCAS, THE ART OF PUBLIC SPEAKING 18–21 (12th
ed. 2015).
36 Nadia Khomami, #MeToo: How a Hashtag Became a Rallying Cry Against Sexual Harassment, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
oct/20/women-worldwide-use-hashtag-metoo-against-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/
8L7S-5TS5].
37 Lori Harrison-Kahan, The Seeds of #MeToo Started Growing 100 Years Ago, CNN:
OPINION (Nov. 2, 2019, 1:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/02/opinions/me-too-move
ment-history-jordan-michelson-harrison-kahan/index.html [https://perma.cc/T93Y-8XTZ].
31
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President Donald Trump, who was caught on videotape bragging about his ability as a celebrity to sexually accost women and get away with it.38 It shaped the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings over the confirmation of Brett Kavanaugh
to the U.S. Supreme Court where allegations of sexual assault against the nominee were made and discussed.39 What someone can say about sexual harassment, or even sexual relations generally, is different today than it was before
this movement.40 The speaker on these issues must consider which opportunities have been opened and which have been foreclosed, and what adaptations
must be made to fit the particulars of this context.
This contemporary example also highlights a possibility that the ancients
scarcely considered regarding Kairos. Actress Alyssa Milano built upon the
“MeToo” hashtag of social activist Tarana Burke to encourage women to come
forward with their allegations of sexual harassment.41 Their actions shaped the
context within which we now discuss these issues, creating a unique kairotic
context that encourages some speech and discourages other speech, in terms of
content, style, speaker, occasion, and so forth. Commentators have begun noting a new caution in dating and work relationships between men and women.42
So we should consider the extent to which rhetors not only respond to kairotic
situations, but also help to create them. A debate over rhetorical theory in the
early 1970s, which I turn to next, helps to frame a consideration of the role of
rhetors in this regard.
II. KAIROS IN “THE RHETORICAL SITUATION”
In his classic 1968 essay “The Rhetorical Situation” Lloyd F. Bitzer explores “the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse,” in short, what makes a situation “rhetorical.”43 Although he does

On the achievements of the first women’s movement, see 1 KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL,
MAN CANNOT SPEAK FOR HER: A CRITICAL STUDY OF EARLY FEMINIST RHETORIC 4–6 (1989).
38 Philip Bump, How the ‘Access Hollywood’ Incident Gave Us the Trump We Recognize
Today, WASH. POST (July 10, 2019, 11:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/2019/07/10/how-access-hollywood-incident-gave-us-trump-we-recognize-today [https:
//perma.cc/C6DL-23GZ].
39 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, Brett Kavanaugh and Christine Blasey Ford
Duel with Tears and Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/
27/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-confirmation-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/X8G5-YMMF].
40 Khomami, supra note 36.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Philip Galanes, Dating After #MeToo, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/10/11/style/metoo-dating.html [https://perma.cc/8UMT-HB2M]; Nicho
las Kristof, Navigating the Male-Female Work Relationship, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/opinion/me-too-male-bosses.html [https://perma.cc/5
CXZ-C2D3].
43
Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 1 (1968).

20 NEV. L.J. 855

Spring 2020]

KAIROS

861

not use the term Kairos, the essay is centrally concerned with that concept.44 He
suggests that a given situation “invites” discourse capable of addressing an actual or potential exigence that speech theoretically could partially or wholly
remove by persuading an appropriate audience to change its beliefs or actions.45
He describes discourse that is well adapted to the needs of the situation as “fitting,” that is, as “meet[ing] the requirements established by the situation.”46
The situation to which the rhetor must adapt is “a . . . context of persons,
events, objects, and relations . . . . ”47 Fitness is a traditional element of Kairos,
and a sense of “due measure” (in meeting what the situation requires) is implied.48 Furthermore, the sense of “right timing” and “opportunity” is reflected
in Bitzer’s position that rhetors may miss their chance to address such situations because “many rhetorical situations mature and decay without giving birth
to rhetorical utterance.”49 Just because there is an “opening” does not mean an
appropriate rhetor will use it.
Five years after Bitzer’s inaugural essay in Philosophy & Rhetoric, Richard
E. Vatz responded to the essay in the same journal, rejecting Bitzer’s “realist”
philosophy of meaning and his account of the rhetorical situation, asserting:
“No situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter
or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it.”50 Instead of the situation controlling the rhetor, Vatz would position the rhetor as
the selector of facts from an endless “context” and the creator of “meaning”
through linguistic depiction.51 His differences with Bitzer could not be starker
when he asks, “What is the relationship between rhetoric and situations?” and
responds:
It will not be surprising that I take the converse position of each of Bitzer’s major statements regarding this relationship. For example: I would
not say “rhetoric is situational,” but situations are rhetorical; not “ . . .
exigence strongly invites utterance,” but utterance strongly invites exi44

Classical rhetorical scholar Edward Schiappa once suggested to me that rhetorical scholars were not really exploring kairos much by 1968, so it is not surprising that Bitzer leaves
out the term. Indeed, the earliest journal article to mention kairos in EBSCO’s Communication and Mass Media Complete index is from 1973 and it does not appear in a major essay
again for ten more years. Search for “kairos,” EBSCO COMM. & MASS MEDIA COMPLETE,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/search/basic?vid=1&sid=8f33e3e6-42cf-4177-b2f85ba65ee7f3e2%40sessionmgr4007 [https://perma.cc/7R2X-SZSZ] (select “Advanced
Search” hyperlink; then enter “kairos” in the search bar; select the box for “Also search
within the full text of the articles”; select search; order results by “Date Oldest”; narrow by
“Academic Journals”).
45 Bitzer, supra note 43, at 6.
46 Id. at 10.
47 Id. at 4–5.
48 Sipiora, supra note 16, at 116.
49 Bitzer, supra note 43, at 6.
50 Richard E. Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHIL. & RHETORIC 154, 154
(1973).
51
Id. at 160.
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gence; not “the situation controls the rhetorical response . . . ” but the
rhetoric controls the situational response; not “ . . . rhetorical discourse
. . . does obtain its character-as-rhetorical from the situation which generates it,” but situations obtain their character from the rhetoric which
surrounds them or creates them.52
In acceding so much power to the rhetor to shape the situation, Vatz practically erases any consideration of Kairos; since “opportune moments” can simply be fashioned by speakers who create reality for their audiences, they are never “in” the situations faced by rhetors. The dispute between Bitzer and Vatz
throws into relief the question of the rhetor’s role in creating situations that
provide kairotic “openings.”
Smith, the philosopher, comes closest to Bitzer’s position in distinguishing
the ancient Greek conception of Kairos from chronos, or time:
In chronos we have the fundamental conception of time as measure, the
quantity of duration, the length of periodicity, the age of an object or artifact, and the rate of acceleration of bodies, whether on the surface of
the earth or in the firmament beyond. The questions relevant to this aspect of time are: “How fast?” “How frequent?” “How old?” and the answers to these questions can be given in cardinal numbers or, as it may
be, in terms of limits that approach these numbers. By contrast, the term
Kairos points to a qualitative character of time, to the special position an
event or action occupies in a series, to a season when something appropriately happens that cannot happen just at “any time,” but only at that
time, to a time that marks an opportunity which may not recur. The question especially relevant to Kairos is “When?” “At what time?”53
Contrary to Vatz’s claim that “[n]o situation can have a nature independent
of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he
chooses to characterize it,”54 Smith finds objectivity in the operations of time,
since the processes by which things function have tendency and directionality.
For example, a “flower now in the vase as something that has become” after
“the minimal time required” for that outcome.55
Bitzer no doubt would agree with Smith that chronos undergirds an “ontological dimension of Kairos as manifest in various orders of happening, such as
constellations of historical events, natural processes, and developments which
have their own temporal frames and opportune times quite apart from human
action, especially the action of this or that individual.”56
Smith does allow for human engagement with this external unfolding in
time, admitting: “It is, of course, true that there will always be a subjectsituation correlation where Kairos is concerned, since someone will have to
know or believe that he knows the right ‘when,’ but this insight does not create
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 158–59.
Smith, supra note 18, at 47.
Vatz, supra note 50, at 154.
Smith, supra note 18, at 50.
Id. at 47–48.
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that ‘when’ out of itself.”57 Because the “when” is independent of the rhetor,
like Bitzer, Smith believes that “all the kairoi or turning points in the historical
order” present opportunities that may be “seized upon” or “missed.”58
Eric Charles White comes closer to Vatz’s position. He asserts that “the
persuasive force of a speech does not derive from its correspondence to a
preexistent reality or truth. Truth is relative to the speaker and the immediate
context.”59 White’s recognition of the “immediate context” at least nods to
some “reality” in the situation, which circumscribes discourse so that
“knowledge comes to depend on the occasion of utterance. Or to put it another
way, there is no meaning outside of a specific context of rhetorical persuasion.”60 He asserts that discourse functions in the kairotic moment to offer
“pragmatic closure” through “pure force of will” in practical decisions that face
a “truth [that] is self-contradictory.”61
Contemporary rhetorical scholars from a variety of fields and perspectives
have emphasized the power of the rhetor to shape audience understandings of
situations. For example, rhetorical scholars have clearly demonstrated that there
is no such thing as a neutral vocabulary for representing reality. As Richard
Weaver argued, “language is sermonic,” always laden with value judgments
and carrying attitudes.62 Kenneth Burke showed that language creates “terministic screens” that draw attention to some things and away from others, pushing
us to follow the implications of our terminologies.63 Chaïm Perelman and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca showed how strategies of discursive association and dissociation draw upon our understanding of the “structure of reality.”64 Walter Fisher
explained that humans most naturally engage the world through stories that
give meaning to existence and our place in it.65 Ernest Bormann described how
groups fantasize about their social world, identifying heroes and villains, key
actions, and formative settings.66
On the other hand, rhetorical scholars have also noted how the rhetorical
situations within which Vatz’s “free” rhetorical agents operate are shaped by
history, culture, and technology. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall
57

Id. at 48.
Id. at 52.
59 ERIC CHARLES WHITE, KAIRONOMIA: ON THE WILL-TO-INVENT 15 (1987).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 16.
62 RICHARD M. WEAVER, LANGUAGE IS SERMONIC: RICHARD M. WEAVER ON THE NATURE OF
RHETORIC 18 (Richard L. Johannesen et al. eds., Louisiana Paperback 1985 ed.) (1970).
63 KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE, LITERATURE, AND
METHOD 45–46, 49–52 (1966).
64 CHAÏM PERELMAN & LUCIE OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON
ARGUMENTATION 261–63 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 2008 ed.) (1969).
65 Walter R. Fisher, Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public
Moral Argument, 51 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 1, 1–2 (1984).
66 Ernest G. Bormann, Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social
Reality, 58 Q.J. SPEECH 396, 401 (1972).
58
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Jamieson explained how expectations regarding conventional occasions frame
audience assessments of what a speaker is doing.67 Thomas Kuhn, Stephen
Toulmin, and James Boyd White emphasized how particular fields of discourse
develop their own paradigms, standards, and cultures of argument.68 Michel
Foucault argued that at a given point in time discursive formations underwrite
implicit rules about who can talk about what and for how long in a certain situation.69 Raymie McKerrow argued that discourse, power, and knowledge are
mutually supportive, undergirding both domination and liberation.70 Marshall
McLuhan highlighted the role of technologies in extending human perception
by creating virtual “nervous systems” that have profoundly reshaped our relationship to the world.71
I could easily extend these lists of those who have highlighted the agency
of the individual rhetor in shaping the rhetorical situation and of those who
have stressed the processes that put constraints on those rhetorical situations,
but the point should be clear that rhetors are not free to engage in any discourse
they choose in a particular situation, nor are they completely constrained by a
situation given the considerable resources of rhetoric. I have spent much of my
career examining difficult rhetorical situations faced by rhetors and documenting how they have attempted to wriggle out of their rhetorical corners—
sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully. For example, on the unsuccessful side, I examined how the U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative majority
defended its decision in Bush v. Gore to stop the recounting of “undervote” ballots in Florida and effectively award the 2000 election to their preferred presidential candidate, George W. Bush.72 I call this unsuccessful, despite their political victory, because even their most eloquent defenders rejected one or more
of their arguments in favor of alternative (and troubling) rationales.73 In short, I
67

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell & Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Form and Genre in Rhetorical Criticism: An Introduction, in FORM AND GENRE: SHAPING RHETORICAL ACTION 17, 21 (Karlyn
Kohrs Campbell & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 1978).
68 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43 (2d ed. 1970);
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 33–36 (2003); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 6–7, 10–11 (1984).
69 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: AND THE DISCOURSE ON
LANGUAGE 115–17 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1972).
70 Raymie E. McKerrow, Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis, 56 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 91,
92–93, 96–102 (1989).
71 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 3–4 (1st MIT
Press ed. 1994) (1964).
72 CLARKE ROUNTREE, JUDGING THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTRUCTIONS OF MOTIVES IN BUSH
V. GORE 19–20 (2007) [hereinafter JUDGING THE SUPREME COURT].
73 Most notably, Richard Posner, who argued that the Court’s true purpose was to avoid a
constitutional crisis rather than strike down a violation of equal protection. RICHARD A.
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURT, 168–69, 175 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore as Pragmatic Adjudication, in
A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 211–12 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002).
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argued that the situation for making a good legal argument to stop the recount
was overly constraining, so they settled for a bad argument in support of their
preferred outcome.74
A successful example I analyzed was nineteenth-century British preacher
Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s sermons on the unpopular topic of election, a doctrine of predestination considered “hateful” because individuals had no opportunity for salvation if they were not elected by God before they were born.75
This puts those who thought they were saved and those who thought they were
beyond salvation on the same level, creating an “appeal” to all.76 And Spurgeon
brilliantly urged from his pulpit that if his congregants turned their lives over to
God today they would find that God had opened their hearts first, prior to their
decision, effectively “choosing” them in His own time.77 Thus was an abstruse
and hateful doctrine converted to an evangelical call.78 The flexibility of human
motives and of theological doctrine—particularly the Calvinist notion of effectual calling, the time when God awakens the elect—gave Spurgeon enough
leeway to have his theological cake and eat it too.79
But Kairos is not about situations wherein a rhetor has a mere chance to
eke out a win; rather, Kairos involves the opportune moment, when conditions
are ripe for rhetorical action, when there is an “opening.” To the extent Vatz
urges that situations provide little to no constraints on the clever rhetor, his position must be discounted.80 Even the most brilliant rhetor could not make
Americans care about the problem of terrorism before the 9/11 attacks as easily
as after them. But, to the extent that Bitzer downplays the importance of perceptions of a rhetorical situation’s otherwise objective elements in creating rhetorical opportunities, his position must be discounted.81 Our country’s inadequate action to address global climate change is a good illustration of the gulf
between perceptions and what Bitzer would undoubtedly call an exigence that
demands a fitting response.82
74

JUDGING THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 72, at 393–94, 400–02.
Clarke Rountree, Charles Haddon Spurgeon’s Calvinist Rhetoric of Election: Constituting an Elect, 17 J. COMM. & RELIGION 33, 33–34 (1994).
76 Id. at 41.
77 Id. at 43–44.
78 Id. at 44.
79 Id. at 44–45.
80 Vatz certainly is correct that rhetorical situations do not cause rhetors to speak, or to
speak in certain ways. As Bitzer argued, rhetors can “miss” opportunities to speak or to
speak “fittingly.” Bitzer, supra note 43, at 10–11. Vatz highlights the necessarily symbolic
character of human “reality,” which is subject to all manner of rhetorical manipulation. Vatz,
supra note 50, at 158–60. On the other hand, he does admit that “consensual symbolism”
such as that surrounding the assassination of JFK, lead to predictable responses. Id. at 160.
81 On this inadequacy in Bitzer’s position, see John H. Patton, Causation and Creativity in
Rhetorical Situations: Distinctions and Implication, 65 Q.J. SPEECH 36, 46–50 (1979).
82 While a majority of Americans now appear to believe that our planet is warming and that
warming is caused by humans, ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION 4 (2019), Presi75
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Following Kenneth Burke, we may draw a useful distinction between the
world of “non-symbolic motion” and that of “symbolic action” or, more generally, “social reality.”83 Rhetorically, we may think of the non-symbolic world
as a powerful resource for rhetorical invention to be mined for persuasive purposes: referencing buildings that were brought down by commandeered planes
on 9/11, average annual world temperatures reaching new highs frequently,84 a
dead Syrian-refugee child washed up on a Mediterranean shore,85 a recording
of Donald Trump making lewd remarks about women,86 and so forth. Our social reality shapes our understanding of the non-symbolic world and of much
more—of intangibles such as ideas, values, ideologies, and doctrines. But social reality itself has an existence apart from individuals—in culture, practices,
public memory, and so forth. In some ways, it is more malleable than the objects of non-symbolic motion that rhetors characterize, but it is sustained by
shared beliefs, which the ancients called doxa.87
While rhetors ideally will adapt to both non-symbolic and symbolic realities when they face a given rhetorical situation, it is often possible over the long
run for them to help shape both realities. That is, rhetors can work to change
both material conditions and social reality. In this way, they can help to create
opportunities for their ascension to the rhetorical stage and their success upon
it. In short, they can have a hand in creating kairotic moments, rhetorical situations where they can serve as the right speaker with the right message to the
right audience on the right occasion. Such long-term rhetorical practices are
common in litigation campaigns and may function in other legal discourses as
well.88

dent Donald Trump was elected after calling global climate change a “hoax.” See Helier
Cheung, What Does Trump Actually Believe on Climate Change?, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51213003; Justin Worland, Donald Trump
Called Climate Change a Hoax. Now He’s Awkwardly Boasting About Fighting It, TIME (July 9, 2019), https://time.com/5622374/donald-trump-climate-change-hoax-event [https://per
ma.cc/BA8A-4Y4T].
83 Kenneth Burke, (Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 809, 814
(1978).
84 Tara Law, Record-Breaking Temperatures Around the World Are ‘Almost Entirely’ Due
to Climate Change, TIME (Aug. 20, 2019), https://time.com/5652972/july-2019-hottest-m
onth [https://perma.cc/N5BZ-3UT8].
85 Helena Smith, Shocking Images of Drowned Syrian Boy Show Tragic Plight of Refugees,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-ima
ge-of-drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees [https://perma.cc/T8M2-ZLTC].
86 Bump, supra note 38.
87 See, e.g., Takis Poulakos, Isocrates’ Use of Doxa, 34 PHIL. & RHETORIC 61, 63–64
(2001).
88
See infra Part III.
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III. CREATING KAIROS IN AMERICAN LEGAL PRAXIS
Some conceptions of Kairos would seem to reject the possibility of prior
planning. White emphasizes the “radical . . . occasionality” in Kairos, making
such stage-setting problematic.89 He argues “[s]ince the circumstances enabling
success may change at any time, Kairos implies that there can never be more
than a contingent and provisional management of the present opportunity. Success depends, in other words, on adaptation to an always mutating situation.”90
Although situations can certainly be fluid, they are not always chaotic or unpredictable. Indeed, the early examples of weaving and medical treatment from
Homer and Hippocrates, respectively, suggest situations that unfold rather predictably, certainly with the regular opening of a warp in weaving and to some
extent with the progress of a known disease.91 Likewise, in public-speaking
classes we teach those preparing for persuasion to analyze the audience and occasion, to consider available evidence and appeals, and to carefully adapt language and delivery to rhetorical purposes. And even if minor adjustments are
required, a “contingent and provisional management”92 can go a long way in
supporting a kairotic opening. This is particularly true for long-term rhetorical
efforts, such as those found in campaigns involving politics, public health, advertising, corporate branding, and the like.93 Notably, we find such stagesetting efforts in litigation campaigns, as I will illustrate with two cases I have
previously examined.
In its efforts to fight de jure racial segregation in public schools, public
transportation, and housing supported by Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but
equal” standard, the NAACP engaged in a four-decade legal campaign led by
its Legal Defense Fund (LDF) that was capped by the Court’s ruling in Brown
v. Board of Education.94 Mark V. Tushnet argued in his book on Brown:
It seems likely that the [NAACP] staff had in mind little more than the general
approach of attacking segregation whenever they could: any positive outcome
was seen as a victory, whether or not strategic analysis suggested that the particular result would have a domino effect or make any other contribution to the accomplishment of the long-term goal.95

I believe we must broaden Tushnet’s conception of this legal strategy to
consider the rhetorical work of creating an ideal rhetorical situation for legal
89

WHITE, supra note 59, at 14.
Id. at 13.
91 See supra Part I.
92 WHITE, supra note 59, at 13.
93 See two illustrations of these adjustments infra Part III.
94 I draw on my analysis of the case from Clarke Rountree, Setting the Stage for Brown v.
Board of Education: The NAACP’s Litigation Campaign Against the “Separate But Equal”
Doctrine, in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AT FIFTY: A RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVE 49–50
(Clarke Rountree ed., 2004) [hereinafter Setting the Stage for Brown v. Board of Education].
95 MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925–1950 52 (1987).
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success. Specifically, the LDF won by working over many decades to develop
appropriate speakers, audiences, messages, and occasions to create the kairotic
opportunity that finally arose in the Brown case.
The LDF strategy brilliantly focused on segregation in graduate education
because there were almost no graduate schools for African Americans in the
segregating states; hence, the LDF initially avoided endless arguments about
equality between particular schools that would have eaten up its legal funds and
failed to challenge constitutional law.96 The LDF developed “speakers,” which
included both lawyers and the litigants it represented.97 It developed the first
course in civil rights law at Howard University to train African American law
students, whose very presence in the courts would support their appeal to be
treated as equals.98 Litigants were recruited carefully through the NAACP’s
newsletter and its local offices; the LDF wanted clients who were well qualiﬁed
for graduate school admission, but denied solely because of their race.99
Because African Americans are a minority, they did not have the kind of
political influence required to significantly impact the selection of judges who
would hear their cases—the audiences of their ideal rhetorical situation.100
Nonetheless, they sought to keep overtly racist judges off the bench in some
cases.101 More importantly, they engaged in jurisdiction shopping, for example,
bringing cases in the South’s border states, such as Maryland, rather than the
Deep South.102 The greatest help came from President Franklin Roosevelt’s appointments that created a progressive bench, many newer members of which
were influenced by the legal realist movement’s philosophy of using law for the
social good.103
The development of the message was the most complicated and difficult of
the LDF’s stage-setting activities. Gathering information on the impact of segregation was easy enough, but most important was the creation of precedents
that they could build upon.104 LDF strategists recognized the dangers of moving
too fast and sought incremental victories.105 They were fortunate when a case
they refused to support succeeded in denying railroads the option to drop expensive ﬁrst-class cars for blacks because there were too few customers to

96

This approach built upon recommendations made by Nathan Margold in his report to the
NAACP. Id. at 25–28.
97 Setting the Stage for Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 94, at 58–60.
98 Id. at 59.
99 Id. at 60.
100 Id. at 62.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 61.
103 See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1024 (2004); Setting the Stage for Brown v. Board of Education,
supra note 94, at 75–76.
104 See id. at 64–66.
105
Id. at 69, 74–75.
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make hauling the luxury cars economical.106 The Supreme Court ruled in 1914
in McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. that constitutional rights
were personal, so railroads could not deny service based on the number of persons who wanted them.107 Another case stopped segregating states from providing vouchers for African Americans to attend graduate schools in other
states.108 The cornered states began erecting black graduate schools overnight,
which led to issues of how long a student had to wait for admission (no longer
than whites),109 and whether these schools were equal to existing white graduate schools (they were not).110 Eventually the Court was pushed to consider the
intangibles of graduate school equality, such as reputation, faculty stature,
breadth of the curriculum, honor society opportunities, and so forth.111 The Supreme Court famously referenced such intangibles, which included the stigma
of being segregated from whites, in Brown v. Board of Education.112
Developing the right occasion involves some issues already noted, such as
the place of litigation and the timing. But the most kairotic of considerations is
weighing whether speakers, audiences, and messages are sufficient to mount a
particular case at a particular time. The LDF took an incremental approach to
challenging segregation in graduate education and, at each stage, it had to consider how far it wanted to try to move the ball.113 “Too far too fast” could create a bad precedent, but eventually the LDF had to challenge the “separate but
equal” doctrine directly, which it did in Brown v. Board of Education.114
A narrow understanding of Kairos might reduce it to this very point of decision: “Is the time right?” And the unique adaptation to that “opening” may be
the ultimate exercise of that kairotic insight. However, I would argue that the
coming together of many rhetorical elements into this complex situation—
which I have placed in the general and traditional categories of speaker, audience, message, and occasion—means that strategic work in developing those
elements should be considered part of the work of Kairos. For, in this case, the
LDF did not simply wait for the Brown situation to arise, it set the stage for
106

See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20
L. & HIST. REV. 97, 123–24 (2002).
107 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161–62 (1914).
108 Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 593–94 (Md. Ct. App. 1936).
109 Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633–34 (1948) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
110 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (where Chief Justice Vinson compared the black law school the state of Texas erected overnight with the University of Texas
Law School and noted: “It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between
these law schools would consider the question close.”).
111 Id.; see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640–41
(1950).
112 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954).
113 Two classic sources on the incremental development of law are BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28–31 (1921), and EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–2 (1949).
114 Brown, 347 U.S. at 488; Setting the Stage for Brown v. Board of Education, supra note
94, at 76–77.
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speakers who were prepared, for audiences who were receptive, for messages
that were substantial, and, ultimately, for occasions that were ripe. That stagesetting involved material changes, such as literally having litigants, attorneys,
and judges in place. It also involved symbolic changes, such as altering views
of equality under the Constitution as evidenced by literal records of court decisions that asserted these changing views.
Setting the stage for an ideal kairotic opportunity is difficult. It requires
foresight, imagination, and coordination. In the case of those seeking to overturn Roe v. Wade, the effort has been made more difficult by the diverse range
of forces working the issue.115 Although Americans United for Life (AUL) touts
itself as “the legal arm of the pro-life movement,”116 and it has developed a sophisticated long-term strategy to develop speakers, audiences, messages, and
occasions,117 its work is often thwarted by zealous state officials eager to be the
first state to successfully challenge Roe.118
Among the interesting efforts by AUL to create a situation conducive to
overturning Roe are the strategies of encouraging historians to question the history of abortion practices and thus overcome the Roe majority’s claim that
abortion restrictions are relatively recent; encouraging medical doctors to undertake studies showing that childbirth is getting safer (since the Roe opinion
noted that an abortion was safer than childbirth, so outlawing it put women at
greater risk); and even opposing euthanasia, as it might cheapen public views
of the value of human life.119
Other stage-setting work is more obvious. The efforts to create a pro-life
majority on the U.S. Supreme Court seem to have won out, thanks to Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s thwarting President Barack Obama’s attempt to replace the late Justice Antonin Scalia (who was later replaced with
Justice Neil Gorsuch) and the replacement of Justice Anthony Kennedy with
what appears to be a more pro-life-leaning Justice Brett Kavanaugh.120 The
115

Some recent efforts by different states to restrict abortion are reviewed in K.K. Rebecca
Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the Procedure This Year, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/abortion-laws-sta
tes.html [https://perma.cc/Y9G8-UK3H].
116 Allison McCann, How Americans United for Life Became “The Legal Arm of the ProLife Movement”, VICE (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wjpa
99/this-is-the-legal-arm-of-the-pro-life-movement [https://perma.cc/JJB7-NGL2].
117 Clarke Rountree, Address to the Speech Communication Association in San Francisco:
Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts: The Rhetorical Strategy of Americans United
for Life (Nov. 1989) (on file with author) [hereinafter Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the
Courts].
118 Eric Levenson, Abortion Laws in the US: Here Are the States Pushing to Restrict Access,
CNN (May 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/16/politics/states-abortion-la
ws/index.html [https://perma.cc/SVU7-F927].
119 Reversing Roe v. Wade Through the Courts, supra note 117.
120 Elizabeth Dias & Sydney Ember, Abortion and Travel Ban Rulings Are Victory for
G.O.P. Tactics on Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06
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strategy of placing more obstacles in the way of women seeking abortions
yielded the High Court’s “undue burden” standard, which pro-life states have
pushed to the breaking point.121 But recently many states decided to pass outright bans on abortion to the chagrin of AUL.122 Alabama recently passed a law
that criminalizes doctors who perform abortions at any stage, threatening them
with ninety-nine-year prison terms.123 Any case arising from that law could be
a set-back, since it is a huge legal leap from women having a constitutional
right to abortion to the severe criminal punishment of those who aid them.
Another form of rhetorical stage work is much less systematic but nonetheless important in shaping American law and creating kairotic opportunities. It
involves the work of appellate judges in pushing the law in one direction or another. It is less systematic because judges must await appeals in actual cases to
effectively inject their ideas about what the law is or should be.124 There are rare exceptions, such as the sister cases of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, which
the Court decided on the same day, but appeared consecutively in the court reporter, allowing Justice Blackmun to cite Roe as precedent for Doe.125
More typically, judges follow their own beliefs about the law and its proper
direction, supporting or limiting the expansion of the Commerce Clause powers
of Congress, for example.126 As Cardozo famously recognized, “[e]very judgment has a generative power. It begets in its own image. Every precedent . . .

is his recent dissent opposing the Court’s stay of a Louisiana anti-abortion law in June Med.
Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 663 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
121 Ariana Eunjung Cha, At Least 20 Abortion Cases Are in the Pipeline to the Supreme
Court. Any One Could Gut Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST, (Feb. 15, 2019, 6:20 PM), https://ww
w.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/02/15/least-abortion-cases-are-steps-us-supreme-courtany-one-could-gut-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/Z4XG-APDQ].
122 Susan Roberts, Surprised by All These Abortion Bans? Meet Americans United for Life—
The Most Significant Antiabortion Group You’ve Never Heard Of, WASH. POST (May 31,
2019, 4:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/31/surprised-by-all-the
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Supreme Court review’ of all those likely to go up on appeal, although the provision that
bans abortion once there’s a ‘fetal heartbeat’ does not fit AUL’s approach.”).
123 Matt Stieb, Democrats and Activists Respond to Passage of Alabama Abortion Bill, Most
Restrictive in the Nation, INTELLIGENCER (May 15, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/
2019/05/democrats-respond-to-passage-of-alabama-abortion-bill.html [https://perma.cc
/X2VL-R4RU].
124 Obviously, judges can give speeches, give interviews, or write essays and books expressing their opinions. But they are most effective when their opinions appear in citable cases.
See Anne E. Mullins, Jedi Or Judge: How the Human Mind Redefines Judicial Opinions, 16
WYO. L. REV. 325, 328–29 (2016).
125 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 181 (1973).
126 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist
Court, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 764–65 (2008) (“The earliest indication of an interest by the more conservative members of the Court, led by then-Justice Rehnquist, in finding
a limit on the commerce power came in 1976 in National League of Cities v. Usery.”).
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has a ‘directive force for future cases of the same or similar nature.’ ”127 Even
dissents often function to lay the groundwork for overturning the positions they
reject.128
Of course, judges do not always live long enough to mount the stages they
set; instead, their creation of kairotic opportunities, as in litigation campaigns,
may be taken up by others. Nor do judges always foresee the ways in which
their arguments might be used—the ironic invocation of Justice John Marshall
Harlan’s “color-blind” Constitution metaphor by those opposed to affirmative
action comes to mind.129 But having an official voice in pronouncing the law
does offer an opportunity to build upon one’s line of argument over time.
Finally, we may look at legal norms in American law as helping to shape
situations where the right speakers deliver the right messages to the right audiences at the right times. That is, American law (and other legal systems) have
evolved to ensure that conditions are ripe for effective rhetorical exchanges.
The educational system for law and procedures for licensure ensure that those
appearing in court have at least a modicum of knowledge to speak.130 The election of judges does not necessarily support good audiences, but judicial appointments that are reviewed by bodies such as the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee ideally weed out weak judges.131 Elaborate procedures for indictments, lawsuits, trials, appeals, and the like ensure that litigants and their messages are appropriately before the court and ready for hearing.132 Considerations such as standing,133 jurisdiction,134 ripeness,135 and so forth make cases
that are heard more likely to yield kairotic opportunities by helping to ensure
that appropriate speakers address appropriate audiences at appropriate times on
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129 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the appropriation of the color-blind metaphor by those opposing affirmative action, see Randall Kennedy,
Colorblind Constitutionalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2013).
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appropriate topics. The weight given to stare decisis provides some check on
law’s inconsistency and promotes opportune appeals to precedent.136
Of course, there are exceptions to the tendency of these practices to create
situations for the effective use of Kairos. To take a random example, the rejection of DNA evidence in paternity cases in some states suggests that the law
was slow to catch up with the science;137 an “opportune” moment to provide
greater certainty than the presumptions afforded by ancient common law can be
squelched by traditions, as well as supported by them. Generally, then, legal
practices tend to ensure that general conditions exist for creating kairotic opportunities in legal rhetoric.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR KAIROTIC STAGE-SETTING
I would like to propose a framework for describing and analyzing stagesetting work that seeks to create kairotic opportunities. If we identify the elements that make rhetorical opportunities kairotic, then we can imagine those
elements as coming to be and consider the extent to which they are amenable to
strategic development. I believe we can simplify our understanding of stagesetting kairotic work if we draw upon the basic elements rhetorical theorists
have traditionally identified as central to rhetorical situations: speaker, audience, message, and occasion.138 Each of these are obviously subject to strategic
development, such as recruiting clients (“speakers”) for a litigation campaign,
though their interrelations require that we consider how each is related to the
whole rhetorical situation.
Speakers can be developed in nonsymbolic (or material) and symbolic
ways, as the LDF example illustrates. They can be discovered and strategically
selected or educated and trained, as the clients and lawyers were, respectively,
by the LDF.139 They can develop personal reputations that bolster their standing
as intelligent, trustworthy, and caring (in general or for certain audiences). For
example, President Bill Clinton avoided a draft deferment during the Vietnam
War because as he admitted, he wanted to “maintain [his] political viability
within the system” and realized that such a deferment might hurt his political
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See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in
the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 Nev. L.J. 787, 792 (2012).
137 Margaret A. Jacobs, Ancient Paternity Rule Gets Nod from Courts Over DNA Tests,
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB928284163327
670754 [https://perma.cc/9AZM-JGEN].
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139 See supra Part III.
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career.140 Speakers can brand themselves through their association with particular causes and groups, by achieving notable successes, by fostering alliances,
by evincing unique styles, and so forth. Or, as in the case of Donald Trump,
they can identify with groups against others, such as those opposing President
Obama or immigration across the southern border.141
Audiences can be found and developed. For example, the Internet has allowed members of fringe groups to find one another, coalescing individuals into audiences for White Nationalists, as well as more benign groups.142 Speakers
can seek out such groups or attract a sufficient number of people through their
discourse to create their own audiences. For example, the #MeToo movement’s
message brought many victims of sexual harassment together.143 Longer-term
relationships between audiences, speakers, and messages can prepare audiences
to accept or even clamor for those speakers and messages.
Support for particular messages can be developed over time in terms of assumptions, evidence, arguments, precedents, language, and so forth. The scholarly work of climate scientists, for example, feeds directly into arguments about
the nature and seriousness of climate change.144 National endorsement of the
Paris Climate Agreement sets a precedent for action (as does the U.S. withdrawal from it), even if such precedents lack the formal authority of legal prec-
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edents.145 The strategic replacement of “global warming” with “global climate
change” in the parlance of those discussing the problem carries implications for
rhetorical effectiveness.146
Occasions may be found or developed. Anniversaries, holidays, ceremonial
events, ongoing speech situations (from college classes to staff meetings to city
council meetings), and ad hoc convergences of circumstances can create opportunities for rhetorical action, as well as for squelching them. Political candidates can create occasions out of an announcement that they are running for office or joining a political debate scheduled by others. Anti-abortion activists
typically demonstrate in front of the U.S. Supreme Court building on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, or they may bring a case to court and convene a press
conference to announce their intentions.147 An alleged victim of sexual harassment by Harvey Weinstein can go public with accusations after other accusers
have created an environment in which such claims will be seen as more credible (in fitting a pattern offered by others).148
These brief, selective illustrations of how rhetors can set kairotic stages by
adapting speakers, audiences, messages, and occasions are meant to highlight
the variety of stage-setting opportunities as well as indicate the complexity of
situations they would make ripe for effective rhetorical action. Those who
would set such stages obviously face an uncertain future. How could the
NAACP know, for example, that President Franklin Roosevelt would serve so
long and appoint such progressive judges;149 they certainly could not have predicted that President Dwight Eisenhower would appoint Governor Earl Warren
as Chief Justice,150 or that the new Chief Justice would be so supportive of desegregation?151 But the “radical occasionality” that White warned about should
145
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not deter us from accounting for those things that a rhetor can work to develop
in a future rhetorical situation, as I have suggested. Generally, I would urge us
to think beyond Aristotle’s influential focus in the Rhetoric on the “given case”
of persuasion, which takes the situation as limited to present circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In Kairos the ancients conceived of opportunities presented for action in
warfare, weaving, wagon-loading, and, later, in rhetoric. Greek rhetorical theory was often built around the notion that the particularity of situations required
adaptive responses if speakers were to succeed. What these early rhetorical theorists did not scrutinize was how complex constellations of factors in particular
situations arose and, notably, whether rhetors could help to create them. The
Bitzer-Vatz debate highlights the constraints of rhetorical situations as well as
the possibilities of shaping them. I have argued that over time individuals and
organizations can and have worked to create kairotic moments. This is most
obvious in litigation campaigns, but rhetorical situations are also constructed by
judges and even by legal practices.
Perhaps there are exceptions to my generalization that ancient scholars did
not reflect seriously on how kairotic situations arose, and I welcome research
that considers that question more thoroughly. Obviously, those teaching rhetorical pedagogy were concerned about preparing speakers to be the “right”
speakers—trained, effective, and sensitive to opportune moments. To this extent, they were setting the stage for Kairos. But, as I have argued, I have found
little to suggest a campaign-like concern for Kairos and the possibility of crafting situations.
If The Byrds and Solomon agree, “there is a season, and a time to every
purpose under the heaven,”152 I would add that, as President Bill Clinton said in
his first inaugural address, in some cases, “by the words we speak and the faces
we show the world, we force the spring.”153
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